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Abstract
In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple
two- rm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This
equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two  rms alternate as mo-
nopolists – despite the fact that the model also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially
both  rms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. More-
over, it Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium – as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several
examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented.
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1. Introduction
To escape the discipline of competitive markets, even when only partially or tem-
porarily, typically returns positive economic pro ts. As a result,  rms are tempted to
seek anticompetitive arrangements in order to do so. Many examples of how  rms may
be able to collude have been forwarded in the literate, ranging from overt cartels that
divide the product market in regular conspicuous meetings, to tacit geographical mar-
ket divisions that rely on ingeniously hidden basing point systems. A potential form of
sharing markets that has so far received little attention is intertemporal market division,
in which  rms avoid direct competition by taking turns in serving the market for certain
periods of time. There is, however, quite some indication that this type of collusion is
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indeed practiced. It has been observed, for example, that large companies of relatively
homogeneous commodities that are only substantially di erentiated by application of
marketing methods, such as cola, tend to alternate their advertising campaigns. Dixit
and Nalebu  (1991), e.g., refer to a report on “60 Minutes” that in a span of 52 weeks
Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola each o ered 26 weeks of price promotions between which
there was not one single overlap. They calculate the probability that this would occur
by luck if the two companies were acting independently and each o ered 26 weeks
of “couponing” as 1=495;918;532;948;104, which they conclude is strong statistical ev-
idence for collusive behavior (Dixit and Nalebu , p. 193).
Likewise, television stations often intertemporally alternate their prime shows, such
as news services and sit-coms, so that they do not compete for viewers in the same
time slot. Also, summer events, like open air pop festivals, or local fancy fairs, are
planned in di erent weeks of the season. And similarly, major sports games, particularly
important matches such as  nals, are planned not to overlap – both within one and
the same sport, and among di erent sports. A  nal example, that involves the direct
production of physical commodities, can be found in the market for video games.
There, major players, Nintendo and Sony, tend to alternate the introduction dates of
their next respective video consoles, the brand speci c hardware on which to run their
uniquely compatible games – in which another alternating introduction cycle can be
observed, albeit one with a much shorter longitude. 1
In this paper, we report on the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium that in-
duces an intertemporal division of the market in the simplest possible dynamic game of
competition with entry and exit. It features only two players, so that the intertemporal
market division takes the form of an alternating monopoly. Incumbents are in Cournot
competition, entry and exit decisions are mixed strategies, and there is perfect and
complete information. Although the model also has a long-run Cournot duopoly equi-
librium, the probability that an industry structure of alternating monopoly is observed
converges quickly to one, for all reasonable discount factors, when the  rms coordinate
on alternating. Moreover, the alternating monopoly equilibrium Pareto dominates the
Cournot equilibrium. That is, both  rms are able to obtain higher pro ts by dividing
the market intertemporally between them.
The endogenous possibility of alternating monopoly we point out has, to the best
of our knowledge, not been reported in the literature so far. Closest, probably, comes
an equilibrium found in Maskin and Tirole (1988), in which  rms also take turns
operating as a monopolist (Maskin and Tirole, pp. 564–565). This equilibrium is,
however, importantly di erent from ours, as the authors consider an alternating-move
model, whereas in our model  rms act simultaneously. As a result, their equilibrium
is not Markovian (and otherwise not symmetric) – which the authors regret, as they
advocate Markov perfect equilibrium there and elsewhere, e.g., Maskin and Tirole
(2001). Davies (1991) also features exogenous alternation in strategies, to  nd that
when costs are asymmetric, the market structure will converge to a natural monopoly
with the most e cient  rm as the sole producer. Moreover, due to the alternation
of moves in her model, alternating monopoly cannot be a Markov-perfect equilibrium
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(Davies, 1991, p. 526, footnote 13). The simultaneity of decisions in our model, we
believe, presses the analysis as more  tting to questions of entry and exit, and the
equilibrium found as all the more remarkable.
The equilibrium we  nd is surprising indeed, for it reveals a possible failing of
potential competition, without any of the known arguments for it applying. The bench-
mark model in the central debate in industrial economics on the question whether or
not the threat of potential competition disciplines already incumbent  rms is that of
perfect contestability, de nitely laid out in Baumol et al. (1982). The model predicts
that, in the absence of sunk costs, potential competition is su cient to guarantee pric-
ing at marginal costs, even when the number of both incumbents and potential entrants
is low. Traditionally, going back to Bain (1956), contributions that seek to negate this
result, and instead show that stable positions of market power for incumbent  rms are
possible, rely on the presence of substantial sunk costs to throw up barriers to entry.
In a more sophisticated argument, in Stiglitz (1981) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz
(1988), Cournot competition on quantities among potential entrants that simultane-
ously make their entry decisions, serves as a form of ‘outside’ competition among the
potential entrants that discourages entry for each one of them. This, in fact, forti es
the position of incumbent  rms when the number of potential entrants increases. When
entry is played as a mixed strategy, however, as in Dixit and Shapiro (1986), or when
it is sequential, as in Vives (1988) and Waldman (1991), potential competition gener-
ally again increases actual competition and hence welfare. This is counterbalanced by
a literature that followed up on an example of socially excessive entry in the presence
of sunk costs by Mankiw and Whinston (1986), including a very general setup in Amir
and Lambson (2003).
In a literature that answered Selten’s chain store paradox, see Selten (1978), credible
deterrence of entry relies, e.g., on the presence of imperfect information that allows
for building a reputation to  ght entry. Likewise, through sophisticated punishment
strategies of various kinds, dominant positions can be sustained in repeated games of
entry.
The common perception that potential competition helps actual competition, there-
fore, relies on the imperfections that drive the above results being quite speci c. 2 Yet,
our basic model is perfect in all these respects: there are no sunk costs of produc-
tion, entry or exit, so that there are no barriers to entry; incumbents – when there
are more than one – compete; entry and exit decisions take the form of mixed strate-
gies; players are perfectly and completely informed; and, by limiting the analysis to
Markov strategies, which are independent of history and time, we rule out collusion sus-
tained by ‘tailor made’ punishment. Therefore, one would expect that the model would
quickly display a long-run Cournot duopoly for the case of a market with two potential
entrants. As said, this is a possible equilibrium indeed. Yet, we  nd that the alternating
monopoly equilibrium is dominant.
That fact that our model features no, or relatively small entry and exit costs – with
the latter our analysis can deal as well, as set out in Section 5 – makes that it  ts the
examples given above of tacitly collusive production alternation quite well. In none of
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these examples the  rms involved exit in the sense that they fold up their tents and
leave, to set up again the day after tomorrow. They remain in the market, yet ‘lay
low’ in turns for some periods, to the bene t of their competitors. Therefore, the costs
of switching from producing to not producing are small, and there are no serious sunk
costs from existing either. What is crucial, however – and necessary for an alternating
monopoly equilibrium to exist – is that this ‘laying low’ is credible, in that a cola
producer without an advertising campaign readily available would need some time to
design and produce one, and so would a video game console manufacturer. Likewise,
setting up a rival open air pop event is not done overnight either. Production involves
a start-up lag, that is. Many markets seem to have these, or similar characteristics, so
that, next to the known types of market division, intertemporal market division may
well be a form of collusion that reduces competition, and thus welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our simple
dynamic model with entry and exit. Section 3 establishes the existence of a Markov
perfect equilibrium in which the two  rms divide the market intertemporarily. In Section
4 it is shown that the alternating monopoly is likely, in the sense that the probability that
an intertemporal market division is observed converges to one over time. By introducing
positive exit and entry costs, as well as  xed costs, in Section 5 the robustness of the
alternating monopoly equilibrium is studied. It is found that for modest levels of these
costs, the equilibrium stays to exist. Section 6 closes with some concluding thoughts.
2. A simple dynamic entry-and-exit model
Consider the simplest of possible dynamic models of entry and exit. Two  rms,
producing with constant marginal costs c and no  xed costs, intend to serve a market
characterized by the a linear demand curve, such that the market price p depends on
the quantity totally produced Q as
p = a − bQ: (1)
For each  rm, the decision to be active in the market comes up every period. That
is, when a  rm is in the market, it decides each period  rst how much to produce, and
second whether to remain in the market for another period or to exit. When it is out
of the market it decides whether to enter in the next period or not. Firms take these
decisions simultaneously and independently of one another, and they can randomize
over their strategies. As a consequence, no  rm can observe the decisions of the other.
In the following, there are neither entry, nor exit costs.
At any given time, the industry structure is one of four possible structures: either
both  rms are active in the market, or neither of them – so that there is no production
at all – or one  rm is active and the other is not, or vice versa. Each transition
from a given market structure to another from one period to the next depends on the
simultaneous and independent decisions of the  rms whether or not to be active for
production in the next period. Consequently, this dynamic entry-and-exit model can
be modeled as a stochastic game, where the only stochastic element is caused by the
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The most general strategy a  rm can formulate to play this game is a behavior
strategy. In that, each  rm speci es for each period, each market structure at that period,
and each history leading up to it with which probability to be active in production next
period. To this end, it is assumed that in each period both  rms know the history of
the market structure up to and including the current structure, and that this is common
knowledge. Furthermore, in formulating their behavior strategies,  rms discount the
future pro ts they foresee by a factor  ∈(0;1).
A Nash equilibrium for this model is a pair of behavior strategies, one for each
 rm, for which it holds that each  rm’s strategy is a best response to the strategic
decision of its opponent. In the following, we concentrate on Markov strategies. These
are behavior strategies that are history and time independent, so that at all times actions
depend only on the current state. 3 A Markov perfect equilibrium for this model is a
pair of Markov strategies that yields a Nash equilibrium in every proper subgame.
Notice that the state contains only information on the current market structure – which
 rm is in and which is out – and excludes any information on past behavior. As the
two  rms are really identical – except perhaps for their position in the market – we
consider symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. That is, a  rm behaves in equilibrium
as the other  rm would, when their positions were reversed.
Several motivations for analyzing Markov perfect equilibria in the set of Nash
equilibria can be found in Maskin and Tirole (2001). Markov strategies describe the
simplest form of behavior that is consistent with rationality, enable a clean and
unobstructed analysis of the in uence of state variables, and substantially reduce the
number of parameters so that they can be conveniently simulated. Furthermore, Markov
strategies captures the idea that ‘bygones are bygones’ more completely than does the
concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium. As a consequence, Markov perfection reduces
the multiplicity of equilibria that the Folk Theorem supports. 4 This latter motivation
is of principal interest here: Restriction to Markov strategies, coupled with our state
space, excludes the possibility to tailor behavior in an attempt to punish the rival  rm,
should it break the alternating equilibrium.
In the simple dynamic model considered here, in which the entry decisions of the
potential rivals cannot yet be observed when deciding on the production level and
potential entrants are not able to produce instantaneously upon entry, in equilibrium all
active  rms produce the static Cournot quantity. Hence, when there are k  rms active





(k +1 ) b
; (2)
3 In general, Markov strategies can depend on time. Here, however, we resort to the de nition of Fudenberg
and Tirole, where they do not when the action spaces, instantaneous pro ts and the transition dynamics are
time-invariant – Cf. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995, p. 505). These strategies are also known as stationary
strategies.
4 In fact, the number of Markov perfect equilibria in the type of model considered here can be shown
to be generically  nite, see Haller and Laguno  (2000), and even generically odd, see Herings and Peeters
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Fig. 1. The dynamic entry-and-exit model as a stochastic game.
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In Fig. 1 this stochastic game is depicted, where it is assumed, without loss of
generality, that (a − c)2=b = 1. This can simply be justi ed by the choice of units. A
 rm choosing the strategy ‘in’ will produce in the next period, and a  rm choosing
strategy ‘out’ will be out of production in the next period. The instantaneous pro ts
of the  rms are given by the tuple in the upper-left part of the cells. The lower-right
part of the cell indicates the next state, reached with probability one – (1;1) means
for example both  rms in, and (0;1)  rm 1 out,  rm 2 in.
3. Alternating monopoly
Conventional wisdom quickly leads to the claim that the market dynamics modeled
above will typically result in the two  rms sharing the market forever. After all, in
the Cournot duopoly situation, there is a substantial pro t over and above the entry
costs – here assumed to be zero – for each  rm. Moreover, there is no dynamic
limit pricing – which would be fruitless in the absence of barriers to entry – nor do
 rms deploy sophisticated punishment strategies – as they cannot by construction. And
indeed it is the case that ‘always stay when active’ and ‘always enter when not active’
– or, alternatively, ‘produce in the next period no matter what the current market
structure is’, is a Markov perfect equilibria. We refer to the appendix for an explicit
characterization of the set of Markov perfect equilibria. This characterization enables
the reader to verify easily where a given strategy pro le constitutes a Markov perfect
equilibrium or not.
Table 1 shows, for a discount factor   =0 :95, the equilibrium strategies for each
 rm in each state, as well as the expected total discounted pro ts to the  rms by
coordinating on this equilibrium for each possible initial state.
Irrespective of whether initially neither  rm, both  rms, or one of the two  rms
is in the market, each will produce in the next period with probability 1. There is a
slightly higher payo  for a  rm that happens to be the  rst incumbent, enjoying an
instantaneous monopoly pro t for a single period, when the initial market structure
featured a monopoly.
Apart from this known equilibrium, however, a di erent Markov perfect equilibrium
turns out to exist, with a fundamentally di erent nature. Again for   =0 :95, Table 2
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Table 1
Markov perfect equilibrium with two active  rms
Equilibrium strategies Equilibrium
(Initial) Firm 1 Firm 2 Payo s
state
In Out In Out Firm 1 Firm 2
(0,0) 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.1111 2.1111
(0,1) 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.1111 2.3611
(1,0) 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.3611 2.1111
(1,1) 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.2222 2.2222
Table 2
Markov perfect equilibrium with alternating monopoly
Equilibrium strategies Equilibrium
(Initial) Firm 1 Firm 2 Payo s
state
In Out In Out Firm 1 Firm 2
(0,0) 0.9306 0.0694 0.9306 0.0694 2.3055 2.3055
(0,1) 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2.4359 2.5641
(1,0) 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.5641 2.4359
(1,1) 0.9306 0.0694 0.9306 0.0694 2.4166 2.4166
In this equilibrium, when none of the  rms produces today, each will produce tomor-
row with probability 0:9306. 5 This means that with probability (1−0:9306)2 =0:0048
no  rm will enter, with probability 0:1292 exactly one – the probabilities are equally
split over the two possible situations – and with probability 0:8660 both  rms will be
active tomorrow. Similarly, when in a certain period both  rms are active, the next
period all market structures can be reached with positive probability. However, once a
 rm is the only  rm in the market today it will with certainty stop producing tomor-
row, whereas the opponent  rm that is not in the market today will be for sure one
period later. The market will, in other words, display an alternating monopoly.
Once identi ed as a candidate equilibrium of the model, it is relatively straight-
forward to check that the alternating monopoly equilibrium is indeed a Markov perfect
equilibrium. For that, we explain in the appendix that only unilateral one-stage devia-
tions are relevant to consider. To see next that one-stage deviations from the alternating
monopoly equilibrium strategies are not pro table, the following. Obviously, it does
not pay to not take one’s turn to enter when the other  rm exits. Suppose instead
a  rm considers not leaving the market when it is the other  rm’s turn to serve it.
Then, in the next period the market will display Cournot duopoly, which indeed gives
5 To be more precise, this probability is equal to (−287 +
√
127969)=76, but in the following we will
work with the more convenient decimal approximation. An explicit derivation is given in the appendix.1214 P.J.J. Herings et al./European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1207–1223
Fig. 2. Transition probabilities in market structure.
the defector a one-shot pay-o  increase. However, with high probability the market is
expected to stay in Cournot competition for a number of periods, rather than just one.
This so, since the equilibrium exit probabilities associated with two  rms present in
the market are close to zero. As a result, total discounted pro ts are lower, so that
 rms will refrain from deviating from the alternating monopoly equilibrium. For a more
careful making of these arguments, see the appendix.
4. Is an alternating monopoly likely?
Having established its existence, the natural question to ask is how likely and robust
the alternating monopoly equilibrium is. One approach to this question is to con-
sider how long it takes before an alternating monopoly reveals itself, when both  rms
coordinate on that equilibrium. A  rst observation towards this is on the role of the
discount factor  . For values of   large enough, the alternating monopoly equilibrium
exists and can be calculated. However, when  rms become su ciently impatient, it no
longer pays to divide the market intertemporally, and the equilibrium disappears. This
critical value of   is equal to 0:80, which corresponds to an interest rate of 25% per
period. For all higher discount factors (lower interest rates), an equilibrium industry
structure characterized by an alternating monopoly can be found.
The likelihood of indeed observing an alternating monopoly can subsequently be
studied as follows. Once the industry is in an alternating monopoly situation in a
certain period, it will stay in that equilibrium forever – where at even periods the
one  rm is active and at odd periods the other. When the market structure is not a
monopoly in a certain period, there is a positive probability that it will end up in
a monopoly next period. Consequently, the cumulative probability of an alternating
monopoly increases in time.
To see the speed with which this likelihood converges to one, consider the Markov
process induced by the alternating monopoly equilibrium. Its transition probabilities
are illustrated graphically in Fig. 2 – again for  =0:95. These state-transitions can beP.J.J. Herings et al./European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1207–1223 1215



















Fig. 3. Speed of convergence to alternating monopoly for di erent discount factors.
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The probability of having a certain market structure after two periods knowing the
current market structure is given in the matrix P2. When the current market structure
is !, the probability that the market structure is   ! exactly n periods later is given by
the value of the matrix cell in row ! and column   ! of the matrix Pn. Regardless of
what market structure is initially prevailing, therefore, the probability that an alternating
monopoly is found after n periods is at least equal to Pn(1;2) + Pn(1;3). 6
For all periods up to 50 we have computed these probabilities. The resulting data
are displayed in Fig. 3, for various values of  . Clearly, except for values of   close
to 0:80, within some 50 periods the probability of an alternating monopoly rapidly
converges to one. In fact, for   =0 :90 the cumulative probability of an alternating
monopoly is larger than 0.99 after exactly 50 periods. For   =0 :95 this is the case
after 34 periods, for   =0 :99 after 27 periods, but even when   =0 :85, it takes 98
periods for the cumulative probability of observing alternating monopoly to reach 0.99.
There remains the question how reasonable it is to assume that coordination on
the alternating monopoly equilibrium will happen. Towards answering this, it should
6 Naturally, it is also at least equal to Pn(4;2) + Pn(4;3). Moreover, it can be derived that P(1;2) =
P(1;3) = P(4;2) = P(4;3).1216 P.J.J. Herings et al./European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1207–1223
be noted that in any game with multiple equilibria a similar question arises for each
particular equilibrium. Hence, for that matter, the alternating monopoly case is no less
likely than the Cournot equilibrium. However, if anything, the alternating monopoly
equilibrium is strictly more appealing to both  rms, as they each make more pro ts,
irrespective of the initial market structure. In fact,  rms are able to extract close to the
cartel pro ts, whereas a cartel is not sustainable as an equilibrium in this model.
In the case reported on above, where   =0 :95, the total discounted pro ts of each
 rm in the alternating monopoly equilibrium is at least 8:5% higher than that had
in the Cournot equilibrium. This is when both  rms are initially in the market –
compare to this end Tables 1 and 2. The  rm that is  rst in the market in the initial
states with one  rm so raises its payo  15:5% over the Cournot pro t. On average,
the alternating monopoly equilibrium generates a discounted pro t that is almost 12%
higher than Cournot pro ts. For lower values of   this di erence becomes smaller, and
it eventually converges to zero when   gets very close to 0.80. That is, for all values
for which the alternating monopoly equilibrium exists, it is strictly payo  dominant.
5. Alternating monopoly with entry,exit and  xed costs
The simplicity of the model strengthens the surprise of our result, we believe.
Whereas in the existing literature potential anticompetitive e ects typically derive from
the presence of barriers to entry, in the present analysis competition fails despite of
the fact that  rms can exit, (re)enter and produce without incurring  xed costs. Yet,
it is of interest to consider whether the analysis is robust against the introduction of
such costs. Also, one could argue that the examples of alternating cola advertising
campaigns, the releases of new computer game consoles and seasonal events discussed
in the introduction do feature modest levels such costs and would be better explained
with them included. As it turns out, however, our analysis can deal with either type
of costs just  ne.
It is true that, since (re-)entry costs are to be incurred time and again in the
alternating monopoly equilibrium, su ciently high costs of entry may be incompat-
ible with an alternating monopoly equilibrium, for they outweigh the gain of serving
the market in turn. However, for  =0:95, for example, modest levels of entry costs of
almost 8:5% of the instantaneous monopoly pro ts still sustain the alternating monopoly
equilibrium as a pro table opportunity. 7 With higher (re-)entry costs the alternating
monopoly equilibrium no longer exists, leaving the Cournot equilibrium. This leads to
the counterintuitive conclusion that su ciently high – but not too high – barriers to
entry can, in fact, support a relatively competitive environment. For all entry costs for
which the alternating monopoly equilibrium exists, however, the latter is strictly payo 
dominant.
The introduction of  xed costs, made in every period when producing, does not
jeopardize our results either. Yet, it does drive a wedge between the understandings
of exit/entry as ‘folding up the tent’ and ‘laying low’, discussed in the introduction,
7 That is, entry costs up to 0:0208 which is 8:33% of normalized pro ts – which are equal to 0:25.P.J.J. Herings et al./European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1207–1223 1217
so that our model applies to both. That is, the alternating monopoly equilibrium exists
for various non-speci cally chosen parameter values. 8
In fact, as  xed costs are incurred in either type of equilibrium, alternating monopoly
or Cournot, they have no speci c bearing on the issue at hand. Fixed costs do, however,
open possibilities for interesting further research. We  nd, for example, speci cations
for which the Cournot equilibrium involves losses, whereas the alternating monopoly
equilibrium is still sustainable – this is the case when discount factors and  xed costs
are su ciently high. The reason is that monopolists bear the  xed costs only every
second period. The theory of natural monopoly seems, in other words, compatible with
 rms that share the market intertemporally.
6. Concluding thoughts
We have reported on the possibility, so far unknown, that in the simplest of dynamic,
simultaneous-move models of entry and exit, where none of the traditional assumptions
used to show sustainable dominant positions, such as barriers to entry, simultaneous
entry, retaliation strategies, or alternating moves are made, an alternating monopoly
arises. Moreover, the payo s involved in the alternating monopoly approach the car-
tel outcome, despite the fact that the market allows two  rms to make pro t when
active, and does not sustain a cartel. Consequently also, consumer welfare is impor-
tantly harmed by the ability of  rms to tacitly collude on this intertemporal market
division. Production is decreased below, and prices increased above their duopoly lev-
els, resulting in an increase in dead-weight loss. 9 Hence, antitrust authorities should
be wary of this form of tacit collusion.
This is all the more so, since intertemporal market division may come in many
disguises. For the two- rm model analyzed here, a period-two cycle as observed in
the cola and the game console market reveals itself unmistakenly over time. Yet, the
same may not be true for intertemporal market divisions with a larger number of
potential entrants. An example of such a less obvious collusive equilibrium may be the
market for taxi rides at major hubs, such as train stations and airports. There, common
understanding often is that newly arriving taxi’s that just completed a fare queue up
and await their turn for the next ride. Often this queuing is facilitated by the airport
infrastructure – such as a narrow passage, set o  with curb stones, that does not allow
overtaking – that prevents waiting caps to skip the line, or even a regulator whose
job it is to point customers to their designated taxi. It provides a credible ‘laying low’
8 In fact, the alternating monopoly equilibrium will exist for all triples of  , e and f for which the
probability by which each  rm decides to either enter when the state is (0;0), or stay in the market when
the state is (1;1) is between zero and one. This probability is given by
  =





(5  +4  3−36 2e−36 3f)2−4(5 2−4 3 +3 6  2e +3 6  3f)(−9  +3 6 e +3 6  f)
2(5 2 − 4 3 +3 6  2e +3 6  3f)
;
where e and f are the entry costs and  xed costs respectively.
9 In fact, since in the linear model under consideration dead-weight loss is half of the total (instantaneous)
pro ts between the market parties, the discounted welfare loss left in alternating monopoly is also almost
12% higher on average than that in Cournot equilibrium.1218 P.J.J. Herings et al./European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1207–1223
commitment of the potential entrants. As a consequence, the  rst taxi in the queue is
in a temporary monopoly position, and fares are likely to be priced excessively.
An n- rm extension of the present analysis would accordingly stretch the period
cycle. When the number of  rms increases, an alternating monopoly equilibrium would
imply n − 1 periods of being inactive for each  rm, awaiting its turn to dominate the
market every nth time. Such an equilibrium could be Markov perfect and simultane-
ously symmetric, but not anonymous. It would require the behavior of  rms to depend
on the identity of the incumbents. Even anonymous, symmetric Markov perfect equi-
libria inducing collusion may still exist: Firms enter with small probability when being
inactive and exit with high probability when active, such that all  rms act as a mo-
nopolist once in a while. Obviously, this puts the patience of  rms to the test. But,
as long as the discount factor is large enough, all  rms will obtain a higher payo 
by being a monopolist every nth period than being active all periods with all  rms
present. Since the static Cournot pro t decreases quadratically in the number of  rms
present, the di erence between the pro ts in the two situations increases, so that the
collusive equilibrium may become more likely as the number of  rms increases. It is
also very well possible that a di erent type of equilibrium exists in an n- rm version
of our model, namely one in which clusters of  rms tacitly collude on sharing the
market each period with only a restricted number of them. Over time, these clusters
then alternate, again increasing pro ts at the expense of welfare. The existence and
likelihood of these equilibria are subject of further research.
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Appendix
In the following, a general characterization of the set of Markov perfect equilibria for
stochastic games by means of a formulation of a system of equations and inequalities
is presented. Moreover, the alternating monopoly equilibrium that is displayed in Table
2 is analytically determined and shown indeed to be a Markov perfect equilibrium.
In general, a  nite discounted stochastic game is given by the tuple
  =  N; ;{Si
!}(i;!)∈N× ;{ui}i∈N; ;  ;
in which N denotes the  nite set of players,   the  nite set of states, and Si
! is
the  nite set of actions that player i has at its disposal in state !∈ . The instanta-
neous payo  to player i in state ! when the players play s! =( si
!)i∈N is given by
ui(!;s!). The probability of going from state ! to state   ! when the players play s! is
given by  (  !|!;s!). The players are allowed to randomize their actions. Their instanta-
neous payo -function is extended to satisfy the expected utility property. The transitionP.J.J. Herings et al./European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1207–1223 1219
mapping is extended similarly. Players maximize the total stream of expected payo s,
where the future payo s are discounted by discount factor  ∈(0;1).
The game proceeds as follows. Each player i selects at the initial state !0 an action
 i
!0 ∈ (Si
!0). Then two things happen, both depending on the current state !0 and the
action choices  !0 =(  i
!0)i∈N:
(1) player i earns ui(!0;  !0), and
(2) the system jumps to the next state !1 according to the outcome of the chance
experiment given by  (·|!0;  !0).
Subsequently, in the next period, all players are informed about the previous actions
chosen by the players, and of the new state !1. In this next period, the above procedure
is repeated, starting from the state !1.
It follows from Sobel (1971), see also Theorem 3.5 in Herings and Peeters (2003),
that a stationary strategy-tuple   is a Markov perfect equilibrium if and only if it is





  !∈ 
 (  !|!; −i
! ;s i
!j) i
  ! +  i






!j ¿0;  i
!j ¿0;  i
!j i








!j − 1=0 ( !∈ ;i∈N):
Here,  i
!j is the shadowprice of playing action si
!j, i.e., the disutility of a marginal
increase in the probability  i
!j by which pure action si
!j is played at the initial period,
and  i
! is the expected payo  of player i when the initial state is !,  −i is played
by its opponents, and player i chooses a best response against  −i. The system above
suggests that only one-shot deviations have to be considered. This is indeed the case,
for the following reason.
Suppose all other players play stationary strategies  −i, to which  i is the best
stationary response for player i. If player i is not able to improve its expected payo 
by a deviation from its strategy  i in one stage only, then it follows by a backward
induction argument, that neither will it by any  nite number of deviations from its
strategy. In nitely many changes will also not improve player i’s expected payo .
Suppose that it would. Then, by a pro t-to-go argument, player i would also be able
to increase its payo  by  nitely many changes, which is not possible. 10
10 De ne M = max(i;!;s!)|ui(!;s!)|. Then the maximum payo  a player can earn from time k onwards is
bounded from above by  k(1 +   +  2 + ···)M =  kM=(1 −  ), the so-called maximum ‘pro t-to-go’ value.
Suppose player i is able to improve its payo  by j through in nitely many changes. When k grows large,
the pro t-to-go value is at a certain point less than j (this is when k¿log(j(1− )=M)=log( )). This means
that the payo  improvement by changes until time k ( nitely many changes) was positive.1220 P.J.J. Herings et al./European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1207–1223
Searching for equilibria where the two  rms behave symmetrically, the  rst line of
the system of (in)equalities becomes
s1
(0;0)out :0 +  { 1
(0;0)out 1
(0;0) +  1
(0;0)in 1
(0;1)} +  1
(0;0)out =  1
(0;0);
s1
(0;0)in :0 +  { 1
(0;0)out 1
(1;0) +  1
(0;0)in 1
(1;1)} +  1
(0;0)in =  1
(0;0);
s1
(0;1)out :0 +  { 1
(1;0)out 1
(0;0) +  1
(1;0)in 1
(0;1)} +  1
(0;1)out =  1
(0;1);
s1
(0;1)in :0 +  { 1
(1;0)out 1
(1;0) +  1
(1;0)in 1
(1;1)} +  1






+  { 1
(0;1)out 1
(0;0) +  1
(0;1)in 1
(0;1)} +  1






+  { 1
(0;1)out 1
(1;0) +  1
(0;1)in 1
(1;1)} +  1






+  { 1
(1;1)out 1
(0;0) +  1
(1;1)in 1
(0;1)} +  1






+  { 1
(1;1)out 1
(1;0) +  1
(1;1)in 1
(1;1)} +  1
(1;1)in =  1
(1;1);
where the game data and variables are written from  rm 1’s perspective, and  rm
2 behaves identically by the symmetry assumption. In the alternating monopoly, the
probability that  rm 1 enters the market in state (0;1) and exits in state (1;0) equals
one:  1
(0;1)in =  1
(1;0)out. Moreover,  1
(0;1) = 1
4(  +  3 +  5 + ···)=1




41=(1− 2). In state (0;0) and (1;1) the  rm plays mixed,
such that by complementarity the corresponding  ’s are equal to zero. Substitution of
these data simpli es the system of equations to:
s1


































1 −  2;
s1
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The rows indicated by s1
(0;1)in and s1
(1;0)out are trivially satis ed and therefore redundant.
The rows indicated by s1
(0;1)out and s1
(1;0)in only have to be used for verifying that the
value of the  ’s appearing in these rows are nonnegative.
We consider next whether there are candidate equilibria where the probability by
which a  rm enters in state (0;0) is equal to the probability by which it stays in state
(1;1):  1
(0;0)in =  1
(1;1)in =  . We  nd from the  rst and the seventh (or second and
eighth) equation that  1




=  . As a result, only two equations remain:
 
 

























1 −  2[1 −  (1 −  )]
−1 :




1 −  2(1 −  )+
1
9

































  + {−1+ } =0
follows. Solving this equality gives the probability of entry when no  rm is present




9  + 4





9  + 4
9 2 − 4
9 3)2 − 4(5
9  −  2 + 4
9 3)(−1+ )
2(5
9  −  2 + 4
9 3)
:







In Table 2 in the text, the data on all  ’s and  ’s are displayed. For instance  2
(0;0)in
stands for the probability by which  rm 2 enters when the current state prescribes no
 rms being active and is equal to 0:9306, which corresponds to the analytical solution
derived above. The quantity  1
(0;1) denotes the total discounted expected pro t for  rm
1 when initially only  rm 2 is active and is equal to 2:4359. By substituting this data
in the original system of equalities and inequalities, it can be veri ed that we have
found a Markov perfect equilibrium indeed.
For instance, substituting the data of Table 2 in the equation corresponding to the
strategy s1
(1;1)out leads to
0:1111 + 0:95[0:9306 × 2:4359 + 0:0694 × 2:3055] +  1
(1;1)out − 2:4166 = 01222 P.J.J. Herings et al./European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1207–1223
or, equivalently
 1
(1;1)out =2 :4166 −{ 0:1111 + 0:95[0:9306 × 2:4359 + 0:0694 × 2:3055]}:
The right-hand side is the di erence between the equilibrium payo  to  rm 1 with
initially both  rms being active and the payo  when  rm 1 deviates to playing strategy
s1
(1;1)out with probability one, i.e., exiting the industry for sure, in the initial stage only.
Since,  1
(1;1)out equals zero, there is no gap between the two payo s, as is typical when
a mixed strategy is played. Therefore, exiting the industry with positive probability is
an optimal action (given that the opponent plays according to its alternating monopoly
equilibrium strategy).
When we substitute the data in the equation corresponding to the strategy s1
(1;0)in of
the same block of equations, we obtain
0:2500 + 0:95[1:0000 × 2:4166 + 0:0000 × 2:5641] +  1
(1;0)in − 2:5641 = 0;
which can be rewritten as
 1
(1;0)in =2 :5641 −{ 0:2500 + 0:95[1:0000 × 2:4166 + 0:0000 × 2:5641]}:
Since  1
(1;0)in equals 0:0183, this implies a positive gap between the equilibrium payo 
to  rm 1 when initially only  rm 1 is active and the payo  when  rm 1 deviates
to playing strategy s1
(1;0)in with probability one, i.e., stay active, in the initial stage.
Therefore, staying active with positive probability at a state where  rm 1 is a monop-
olist is a suboptimal action when  rm 2 plays according to the alternating monopoly
equilibrium.
After substituting all data in all equations and inequalities that characterizes the set




(0;1)in, and  2
(1;0)out are zero. This means that playing the actions s1
(0;1)out and
s1
(1;0)in with positive probability has a negative e ect on the total discounted pro t for
 rm 1.
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